Introduction
With the development of cloud computing, users are apt to store their data on the cloud server. It is inefficient to distribute these encrypted data to a set of users with specific attributes in traditional cryptosystems, for example, PKI, IDbased cryptosystem [1] . For this reason, Sahai and Waters [2] firstly proposed the concept of attribute-based encryption. In attribute-based encryption (ABE), ciphertexts and keys are associated with sets of attributes and access structure over attributes. There are two kinds of ABE systems: the first one is ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE); the second one is keypolicy ABE (KP-ABE).
How to achieve a more expressive access policy over many attributes is an important problem in ABE. Sahai and Waters [2] scheme was limited to specify as threshold access policies with one threshold gate. After that, Lewko et al. [3] used monotone span programs (MSPs) as access policy to devise a CP-ABE and a KP-ABE, which are proved secure in composite bilinear groups. However, their schemes are very inefficient, since the length of ciphertexts and keys, and the number of pairings in decryption are all polynomial in the size of MSPs. In order to improve the efficiency, some ABE systems make use of linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) or Boolean formulas as access policy. Waters [4] employed LSSS matrix as access policy to realize CP-ABE. In [5] , Goyal et al. provided a mapping from a universal access tree to formulas consisting of threshold gates. They used this technique to construct a bounded CP-ABE scheme. There is a close relation between LSSS and MSP access structure, and Beimel et al. [6] proved it. Pandit and Barua [7] used minimal sets to realize the smallest MSP for describing general access structure in ABE systems.
However, in some applications, the access policies may also be sensitive. For example, if the ABE scheme is deployed in smart grid [8] , the access policies may contain the private information about underlying data, data owner, or the data recipients. Thus, some grid operators such as electric utilities competing with each other as business entities might not comfortably disclose access policies to other entities. Another example is e-health system: the patients encrypt their health records with access policies and store them in the cloud storage provider. However, the access policies may leak lots of sensitive information. In Figure 1 , the access policy reveals that the patient suffers from the heart disease.
Lai et al. [9] proposed a CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access policy. The attribute values are not disclosed in the access policy. However, it is not a CP-ABE with fully hidden access policy. In 2013, Sreenivasa Rao and Dutta [10] proposed a recipient anonymous CP-ABE, which only uses the AND-gate access policy. Given the widespread applications of ABE schemes, constructing an efficient ABE scheme with hidden policy while supporting more expressive access policy is a crucial problem. In this paper, we propose a CP-ABE with hidden policy (CP-ABE-HP) from Waters efficient construction, which makes use of LSSS as the access policy. A comparison in properties and security levels of current CP-ABE schemes is given in Table 1 .
Organization. In Section 2, we review four statics assumptions in composite order groups and the LSSS access structure. In Section 3, we provide the definition and security model of CP-ABE-HP. In Section 4, we devise a concrete CP-ABE-HP scheme. In Section 5, we prove our scheme by using the technique of dual system encryption. In Section 6, we conclude our paper.
Background
In this section, we firstly give the definitions four hard assumptions. Secondly, we provide the formal definitions for LSSS.
Hardness Assumptions.
Bilinear groups of composite order are groups introduced by [11] , where the group order is product of two or more distinct primes. In our construction, we use the group order of = 1 2 3 , where 1 , 2 , 3 are three distinct prime numbers. We denote this group as G, and admit an efficient bilinear map̂: G × G → G , where G 's order is the same as G's. Any element of G can be denoted as 1
where is the generator of subgroup G . Each G has the order , and ∈ Z . We denote G as the subgroup of order in G. For all ∈ G , can be defined as the product of an element in G and an element in G . For all V ∈ G and ∈ G ,̂(V, ) = 1 if ̸ = . The following are three hardness assumptions, which have been analyzed in [10] .
Definition 1 (assumption 1). Given Θ = ( = 1 2 3 , G, G , ), if for all PPT algorithm A, there is a negligible probability such that
where the probabilities are over the random choice
, if for all PPT algorithm A, there is a negligible probability such that
where the probabilities are over the random choice of
where the probabilities are over the random choice of , ∈
Access Policy and Linear Secret Sharing Scheme.
We adapt our definitions which are given by [12] [13] [14] .
Definition 5 (access policy). Let { 1 , . . . , } be a set of attributes. An authorized collection A ⊂ 2 { 1 ,..., } is monotone, on the condition that ∀ , , ∈ A and ⊆ ; then ∈ A.
Definition 6 (linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS)). If the following two conditions are satisfied, then a secret sharing scheme Π is called linear. (1) The shares for each attribute form a vector from Z . (2) There exists a sharing-generating × matrix A for Π. For all = 1, . . . , , the map maps the th row of A to an attribute labeling ( ). Then, we select a random column vector V = ( , 2 , . . . , ), where ∈ Z is the secret to be shared and AV is the vector of shares of the secret according to Π.
CP-ABE with Hidden Policy

Definition. A normal CP-ABE scheme is composed of four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms:
(1) Setup(1 , Σ): the setup algorithm inputs a security parameter and an attribute set Σ and outputs system public key MPK and master key MSK.
(2) KeyGen(MSK, S): this algorithm inputs an attribute set S and MSK and outputs a private key SK S .
(3) Encrypt(M, A): the encryption algorithm inputs an access structure A and a message M and outputs a ciphertext CT.
(4) Decrypt(CT, SK): this algorithm inputs a ciphertext CT for an access structure A and a private key SK for a set S and outputs M if and only if the attribute set S satisfies the access structure A.
Let Σ and M be the monotone attribute space and the message space, respectively. ∀M ∈ M, ∀A ∈ 2 Σ , ∀S ∈ A, and ← Decrypt(SK, Encrypt(MPK, , A)), where (MPK, MSK) ← Setup(1 , Σ) and SK ← KeyGen(MSK, S).
Security Model of CP-ABE-HP.
In this section, we provide the security definition of CP-ABE for semantic security with hidden policy (CP-ABE-HP).
Setup. The challenger C generates MPK and MSK and sends MPK to A. Query 1. The adversary A is allowed to make key extraction queries for the sets of attributes 1 , 2 , . . . , 1 . C runs the KeyGen algorithm and responds to the secret keys
Callenge. A outputs two messages 0 , 1 ∈ M and two access policies A * 0 and A * 1 such that 1 , 2 , . . . , 1 does not satisfy A * 0 and A * 1 . C randomly chooses a bit ∈ {0, 1} and returns the ciphertext CT * ← Encrypt( , A * ).
Query 2.
A can make the key extraction queries like Query 1 with the restriction that none of these satisfies A * 0 and A * 1 .
Response. Finally, A outputs a guess of . A's advantage of this game can be defined as ADV A (1 , Σ) = |2 Pr[ = ] − 1|.
Definition 7 (CP-ABE-HP). A CP-ABE is CPA secure with respect to hidden policy on the condition that ADV A is negligible in the above game.
Construction of CP-ABE with Hidden Policy
Waters CP-ABE Construction.
Waters most efficient CP-ABE construction [4] takes as input a LSSS access matrix and hides a random number ∈ Z according to .
Setup( ).
This algorithm inputs the number of attributes . Then, it chooses a prime order group G, a generator , and random group elements 1 , . . . , that are corresponding to the attributes in the system. And then, it selects random exponents , ∈ Z . The master public key MPK = ( , ( , ) , , 1 , . . . , ) and the master secret key MSK = .
Encrypt( , ( , ), M). Here, is a × matrix and ( , ) is a LSSS structure, where the map maps rows of to attributes. This algorithm randomly chooses V = ( , 2 , . . . , ) ∈ Z . For = 1 to , it calculates
where is the th row of . Then, the algorithm randomly chooses 1 , . . . , ∈ Z . The ciphertext CT is as follows:
along with an access structure of ( , ).
KeyGen(
, ). This algorithm chooses a random ∈ Z and computes the secret key SK on a set of attributes as
Decrypt( , ). This algorithm inputs a ciphertext CT associated with ( , ) and a secret key SK on a set of attributes. We suppose that satisfies ( , ) and let = { : ( ) ∈ }. Then, { ∈ Z } ∈ is a set of constants such that ∑ ∈ = , if { } are valid shares. This algorithm can compute ( 2 , 1 ) (Π ∈ ( ( , 2 ) ( , ( ) )) ) = ( , ) .
Then, the algorithm can recover the message M from 1 by (7) . We now argue that the above scheme is not hidden policy. Some components 2 , , in ciphertext expose some information of access policy. Precisely, given an access policy ( , ), the adversary chooses I ⊂ {1, . . . , } and { ∈ Z } ∈I . (Note that there could be different ways for choosing the value of to satisfy ∑ ∈I = , if { } are valid shares.) Then, the adversary can run a test Π ∈I ( ( , ) ( , ( ) )) ? = ( 2 , ) .
The adversary can use (8) to determine whether CT is encrypted by the access policy ( , ). Thus, the above CP-ABE scheme is said to provide no hidden policy.
Our Construction.
We realize Waters CP-ABE scheme in the composite order groups G 1 2 3 . In our scheme, the ciphertext consists of 3 groups elements and the secret key consists of 2 groups elements. Therefore, the access policy along with the ciphertext is hidden by the elements in group G 2 .
Setup (1 , ) . The setup algorithm inputs a security parameter and a number of attributes in the system. This algorithm runs the bilinear group generator to produce Θ = ( = 1 2 3 , G, G , ), where 1 , 2 , 3 are three distinct -bit primes. Then, it selects random generators 1 , 1 , . . . , ∈ 1 and 3 ∈ 3 . It picks , , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z and sets
and MSK = 1 .
Encrypt( , ( , ), M). Here, is a × matrix and ( , ) is a LSSS structure. This algorithm chooses a vector V = ( , 2 , . . . , ) ∈ Z . For = 1 to , it calculates = V ⋅ , where denotes the th row of matrix . Then, the algorithm randomly chooses 1 , . . . , ∈ Z and 0 ∈ G 3 , { , ∈ G 3 } ∈{1,..., } . The ciphertext CT is as follows:
KeyGen( , ). This algorithm chooses a random ∈ Z and computes the secret key SK on a set of attributes as
Decrypt( , ). The receiver can decrypt the ciphertext by his secret key SK. Let = { : ( ) ∈ } and let { ∈ Z } ∈ be a set of constants such that ∑ ∈ = , if { } are valid shares. The receiver can compute
Then, the algorithm can recover the message M from 1 by (12) .
Hidden Policy. Our scheme can provide hidden policy by using the subgroup G 3 . Suppose the adversary is given an arbitrary access policy ( , ) and a ciphertext CT = ). Then, the adversary can perform the test as follows:
. (13) Note that some pairings in the above equation equal identity in G due to the orthogonal property in composite order groups. There are two possible cases:
(1) If ( , ) = ( , ), then ∑ ∈ = . Thus,
.
(2) If ( , ) ̸ = ( , ), then ∑ ∈ ̸ = . Thus,
(15)
In the above two cases, the test gives a random element in G . So the adversary cannot determine whether the ciphertext CT is associated with the access policy ( , ) or not. Thus, our scheme provides the property of hidden policy. Performance Comparison. Let Pr denote the computation cost of pairing and let Ex denote the exponent cost. For [4] and our scheme, we assume that the LSSS matrix is × . In Table 2 , we provide the performance comparison with Waters scheme [4] , Sreenivasa Rao and Dutta's scheme [10] , and our scheme. In decryption, we only evaluate the computational costs of pairing, since the pairing operation is very time-consuming compared to the other operations.
From Table 2 , we can see that the number of operations in our scheme is almost the same as Waters scheme. However, the operations in our scheme are operated in the composite order groups, while the operations in Waters scheme are operated in the prime order groups.
Security Proof
Our security proof employs a new mechanism which is called dual system encryption, which requires two semifunctional (SF) structures. Let 2 be the generator of G 2 .
SF Secret Key.̃1 = 1 ⋅ 1 2 ,̃2 = 2 ⋅ 2 2 , and ∀ ∈̃= , where 1 , 2 ∈ Z . SF Ciphertext.̃1 = 1 ,̃2 = 2 ⋅ 2 , and (̃1 = 1 ⋅ 1 2 ,̃1 = 1 ), . . . , (̃= ⋅ 2 ,̃= ), where , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z .
When an SF secret key is used to decrypt an SF ciphertext, we will obtain an extra term ( 2 , 2 ) 1 − 2 ∑ ∈ . If 1 − 2 ∑ ∈ = 0, we call an SF secret key a nominally semifunctional (NSF) secret key. An NSF secret key is a special kind of SF secret keys; that means
Theorem 8. Our CP-ABE scheme with hidden policy is chosen message attacks (CPA) secure under assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Proof. We prove this theorem by a series of games. In the first real Game , the key and ciphertext are normal forms. Then, we convert the challenge ciphertext into SF in Game 0 and transform the keys into SF forms one by one in Game (1 ≤ ≤ − 1). In Game , the challenge ciphertext and all secret keys are SF. In Game , the message is distinguishable from a random message in the challenge ciphertext. Finally, in Game , is randomly chosen from G. Thus, the ciphertext is independent of the policy chosen by the adversary.
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Proof. Given an instance ( , 1 , 3 , G, G , ( ) ∈{0,1} ) of assumption 1, C constructs MPK as
where , , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z and 1 , . . . , ∈ G 3 . Consider MSK = 1 . C can answer the key extraction queries A because it knows the master secret key. In the challenge phase, A provides the two challenge messages and two access policies as (M 0 , M 1 , ( 0 , 0 ) * , ( 1 , 1 ) * ). Then, C randomly chooses ∈ {0, 1}, ∈ {0, 1} and values 0 , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z and outputs the ciphertext CT * under access policy ( , ) * as
where =̃⋅ , =̃. This ciphertext is SF, and C simulates Game 0 . If ∈ G 1 2 , C can simulate a normal ciphertext game, Game . Thus, if A can distinguish between an SF ciphertext and a normal ciphertext with a nonnegligible probability, then C can break assumption 1 by using the output of A.
Lemma 10. If Adv
Game − Adv Game −1 ≥ , then assumption 2 is broken.
Proof. Given an instance ( , 1 , 3 , G, G , 1 2 3 , 1 2 , ( ) ∈{0,1} ) of assumption 2, C constructs MPK as
where , , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z and 1 , . . . , ∈ G 3 . Consider MSK = 1 . In order to make the first − 1 secret keys SF, the challenger C randomly chooses ∈ Z and implicitly sets This implicitly sets 1 = ] 2 , = ] 1 , and 2 = ] 2 , so For the th key extraction query from A, C implicitly sets 1 as the G 1 part of and sets the secret key as
(21)
If ∈ G 1 , then the secret key is distributed as normal secret key. If = 1 2 2 ∈ G 1 2 , then the secret key is properly distributed as semifunctional key.
In the challenge phase, A provides the two challenge messages and two access policies as (M 0 , M 1 , ( 0 , 0 ) * , ( 1 , 1 ) * ). Then, C randomly chooses ∈ {0, 1}, ∈ {0, 1} and values 0 , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z . In order to generate the SF ciphertext, C implicitly sets 1 2 3 = 1 2 3 ∈ G and outputs CT * under access policy ( , ) * as
If ∈ G 1 , then C can simulate Game −1 , and if ∈ G 1 2 , then C can simulate Game . Thus, if A can distinguish between an SF secret key and a normal secret key with a nonnegligible probability, then C can break assumption 2 by using the output of A.
Lemma 11. If Adv
Game − Adv Game ≥ , then assumption 3 is broken.
Proof. Given an instance ( , 1 , G, G , 1 2 , 3 , 1 2 3 , 2 , ( ) ∈{0,1} ) of assumption 3, C constructs MPK as
where , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z and 1 , . . . , ∈ G 3 . In order to make the secret keys SF, the challenger C randomly chooses , ∈ Z and responds to each key extraction query from A on a set of attributes as
This implicitly sets 2 = 2 (1−1/ ) 2 and 2 = 2 / 2 . so 1 , 2 are properly distributed as SF secret key components.
In the challenge phase, A provides the two challenge messages and two access policies as (M 0 , M 1 , ( 0 , 0 ) * , ( 1 , 1 ) * ). Then, C randomly chooses ∈ {0,1} and values 0 , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z . In order to generate the SF ciphertext, C implicitly sets 1 2 3 = 1 2 3 ∈ G and outputs CT * under access policy ( , ) * as
(25) If = ( 1 , 1 ) , then C can simulate Game , since CT * is distributed SF encryption of M . If is a random element in G, then C can simulate Game , since CT * is distributed SF encryption of a random element. Thus, C can can break assumption 3 by using the output of A. 
where , , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z and 1 , . . . , ∈ G 3 . Consider MSK = ( 1 2 ) . In order to make the secret keys SF, the challenger C randomly chooses ∈ Z and responds to each key extraction query from A on a set of attributes as 1 = ( 1 2 ) ( 1 2 ) , 2 = ( 1 2 ) .
(27)
If 2 = 2 , then this implicitly sets 1 = (1 + ), 2 = . so 1 , 2 are properly distributed as SF secret key components.
In the challenge phase, A provides the two challenge messages and two access policies as (M 0 , M 1 , ( 0 , 0 ) * , ( 1 , 1 ) * ). Then, C randomly chooses ∈ {0, 1} and values 0 , 1 , . . . , , 1 , . . . , ∈ Z . In order to generate the SF ciphertext, C randomly chooses an element Δ ∈ G and outputs CT * under access policy ( , ) * as
This implicitly sets 2 = 2 . If = 1 2 3 , then C can simulate Game , since CT * is distributed SF encryption of a random element in G . If is a random element in G, then C can simulate Game , since CT * is distributed SF encryption of a random element in G with being random in G. Thus, C can can break assumption 4 by using the output of A.
From Lemmas 9-12, if assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold, then Game is indistinguishable from Game . Obviously, the adversary can win Game with negligible probability. Thus, our CP-ABE scheme is CPA secure with hidden policy. This completes the proof.
Conclusion
In many applications, such as smart grid and e-health system, access policies for encryption should also be protected as well as the encrypted data, since the access policies may directly contain sensitive information. In this paper, we present a CP-ABE scheme with hidden policy from Waters construction, in which the access policy can be expressed with LSSS structure. Our scheme can be proved CPA secure under four static hardness assumptions.
